When a currency trader borrows Japanese yen at 1 percent to fund the purchase of US dollar assets that yield 5 percent, the trader makes a pro…t unless the dollar depreciates. We examine how such "carry trades" can create speculative dynamics in foreign exchange markets. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model in which speculative dynamics can be ruled out in the absence of funding externalities. The additional assumption that carry traders create positive funding externalities for each other changes the nature of the price dynamics drastically. Not only does uncovered interest parity fail, but a currency with a high interest rate will exhibit the classic price pattern of "going up by the stairs, and coming down in the elevator".
Introduction
A currency carry trade is constructed by selling a low interest rate currency to fund the purchase of a high interest rate currency -that is, by selling a currency forward that is at a signi…cant forward premium. The "yen carry trade"in particular has been the focal point of debate over the last decade or more given the extended period of low interest rates in Japan. The failure of uncovered interest parity is clearly a precondition for the success of a carry trade. If the low interest rate currency were to appreciate relative to the high interest rate currency as predicted by uncovered interest parity, then any gain on the interest rate di¤erential from the carry trade will be exactly o¤set by the capital loss resulting from the exchange rate movement, leaving the carry trader no better o¤.
A popular view among market commentators is that the failure of uncovered interest parity is not only a pre-condition for carry trades, but may also be a consequence of carry trades. A typical quote is the one below from the Economist magazine 1 .
"One obvious possibility is that the actions of carry traders are self-ful…lling; when they borrow the yen and buy the dollar, they drive the former down and the latter up."
Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) o¤er evidence which suggests that carry trades can play a signi…cant role in exchange rate dynamics. 2 The idea that the pro…t from carry trades may be self-con…rming was put forward by Froot and Thaler (1990) , but recent experiences in the foreign exchange market have garnered many more adherents to such a view among 1 Carry on Speculating, The Economist magazine, February 22nd 2007 2 We discuss their …ndings in detail in Section 5:
market participants. The reasoning behind such a view starts with the observation that most central banks set o¢ cial overnight interest rates mainly with domestic considerations in mind, rather than the external exchange rate environment. In ‡ation-targeting central banks, for instance, set their policy interest rate in response to the prospects for domestic in ‡ation. When o¢ cial interest rates are held …xed by central banks in this way, the wedge in interest rates that opens up across currencies allows a carry trader to book a pro…t even if the exchange rate were to remain constant over time by collecting on the ‡ow payo¤ arising from the interest rate di¤erential. Even if the carry trader calculates that the exchange rate will move against him, the expected length of time over which exchange rate will adjust is crucial in the trader's calculations. Even if the exchange rate will move against him eventually, if the adjustment is slow enough, then it may be pro…table to enter a carry trade.
But then, this is a recipe for the exchange rate to deviate further from the predictions of uncovered interest parity. If a trader believes that the dollar will remain strong against the yen, the optimal response would be to buy the dollar and sell the yen. If such beliefs were widespread, the actions of traders acting on their beliefs will put upward pressure on the value of the dollar relative to the yen. In this way, a collective view that the dollar will remain strong against the yen will set in motion trades that will validate such a view. The belief in the success of carry trades can thus become self-ful…lling, and the failure of uncovered interest parity becomes the consequence of carry trades.
This paper develops a theoretical model in which the scenario painted above is the unique equilibrium outcome. We develop our theory on two premises. The …rst is that exchange rates are sensitive to the underlying ‡ow of funds into or out of a currency, at least in the short run. Our second premise is that even though exchange rates may deviate from fundamentals in the short run, there is nonetheless some long term "fundamental anchor" that prevents exchange rates being completely decoupled from economic fundamentals. Both premises have empirical bases. For instance, Evans and Lyons (2002) …nd a signi…cant impact of net order ‡ows on currency returns.
Froot and Ramadorai (2005) outline the evidence both for the short term dependence of prices on ‡ows as well as how fundamentals exert themselves in the long-run.
Our benchmark result rests on these two premises alone. The result is a stark one. Based on these two premises alone, our benchmark result establishes the opposite of our main result. Anticipating that the fundamentals will exert themselves eventually, speculators hasten the return of exchange rates to the level implied by fundamentals, so that speculation serves to keep the exchange rate tightly tethered to the fundamentals. In this sense, speculation is stabilizing in the way that Friedman (1953) envisaged. In fact, under the benchmark case, stabilizing speculation is not only the unique equilibrium of the trading game, it is the only possible outcome that is consistent with common knowledge that speculators are rational.
The impossibility of speculative dynamics in our benchmark case serves the purpose of highlighting the role of funding externalities in our main result.
To establish our main result on speculative dynamics, we posit that each trader's funding constraints are relaxed when many other speculators are already engaged in the carry trade. If carry traders create such positive funding externalities for each other, the stabilizing nature of speculation can be tipped over into a mutually reinforcing mode of speculation in which my incentive to engage in the carry trade is enhanced when others also engage in it. The action to engage in the carry trade become strategic complements across traders, rather than strategic substitutes.
Our …nal step is to re…ne the equilibrium in the trading game with funding externalities by introducing uncertainty in the evolution of fundamentals.
We draw on the tools developed by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001) to solve dynamic coordination games. When combined with the strategic complementarity of actions, we derive price paths for the exchange rate as a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium of the trading game. In this equilibrium, extended periods of slow appreciations of the high rate currency are stochastically punctuated by endogenous crashes.
Currency traders refer to such patterns as "going up by the stairs and coming down in the elevator"(see Breedon, 2001 ).
Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the strand of theoretical literature which shows that in the presence of positive externalities among speculators, rational speculation holes"used by practitioners. Closest to our approach is the contribution of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , who provide a formalization of the bursting of a bubble in a stock market in terms of the endogenous transition from one price path to another one.
Our main contribution to this literature is to o¤er a model in which purely static funding externalities generate entire speculative price paths. Namely, both the slow build-up of speculative carry trades and the subsequent sudden reversal caused by their unwindings are endogenous, and the equilibrium is unique. In other words, we o¤er a simple theoretical description of the slow rise and sudden burst of the "crowded trades" that seem to have played an important role in recent …nancial crises.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. We begin in the next section by outlining our baseline model in which speculation can be ruled out in quite a strong sense. In section 3, we incorporate carry costs and funding externalities and show how the basic character of the model changes abruptly into one where speculative trading become strategic complements across players, rather than strategic substitutes. In section 4, we introduce our main model with stochastic fundamentals, which will be instrumental in re…ning the outcome in the game to a unique, dominance-solvable equilibrium. Our model generates new qualitative predictions on the relationship between the size of the carry trade, the path of the exchange rate, and the probability of a currency crash. Section 5 discusses the existing empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
Baseline Model
Time is continuous and is indexed by t 2 [0; +1). There are two assets. One asset is denominated in Japanese yen and serves as the numéraire. For the benchmark model, we may think of the numeraire asset as a Japanese yen deposit. The other asset is U.S. dollar denominated, and we may construe this second asset as a U.S. dollar deposit. The price (in terms of yen assets) of the dollar-denominated asset at date t is denoted p t . There is a mass m of risk-neutral traders who faces the binary choice of holding either one dollar asset or p t yen assets. We denote by x t the mass of traders who hold dollars at date t.
Our baseline model rests on two key features. The …rst is that fund ‡ows a¤ect currency returns. In particular, we will examine the consequences of return dynamics of the form:
where k > 0. In other words, the dollar appreciates in proportion to the rate at which traders move into the dollar asset and out of the yen asset.
Accordingly, the price p t is normalized to
We are not wedded to any particular microfoundations for (1), but one possible rationalization is in terms of the interactions between a brokerage sector that supply passive demand and supply curves which form the backdrop for the active trading decisions of the speculators. In Appendix A, we provide one possible simple microfoundation for (1) in such terms.
We now turn to the second key feature of our model. Although the short term price movements are dictated by the ‡ows, we will suppose that there is a fundamental anchor to the asset price p t . In the foreign exchange context, the fundamental anchor as given, say, by purchasing power parity, may be quite weak. But however weak the anchor is, the forward-looking behavior of the traders will serve to make its presence felt throughout the analysis.
We model the fundamental anchor by assuming that there is a fundamental value v that is common knowledge among all traders, and that with a Poisson arrival rate , the value of the dollar asset snaps back to v and remains there forever. The idea here is similar to the notion of a "day of reckoning" in Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) on which an exogenous event reveals the value of future consumption generated by the dollar asset to all market participants. The assumption that the price remains at v forever once it has snapped back to v is o¤ered as a simpli…cation. Our focus is on how traders behave in anticipation of this anchor to the fundamental. Consumption takes place only at the day of reckoning.
Traders face a small friction in how often they can trade. A speculator can only trade at discrete designated trading dates that are generated by a Poisson process with intensity . The processes are independent across traders, so that a fraction dt of the traders gets a chance to trade between t and t + dt. This small friction may be interpreted as the time it takes for a hedge fund to structure a large deal with prime brokers, or for a proprietary trader to clear internal risk controls before a large trade. In a very active market such as the FX market, we would expect the traders to have a free hand in trading, which corresponds to a large . Let x t denote the mass of traders who are invested in dollars at date t. This mass has the following dynamics: ( x t = x t when traders sell the dollar x t = (m x t ) when traders buy the dollar This departure from continuous trading strategies is the key feature of the model that warrants equilibrium uniqueness in Section 3.
At trading date t, a trader who holds the dollar asset faces a binary decision -to keep it or to sell it for p t yen assets. For a trader who does not already hold the dollar asset, the binary decision is either to buy it at price p t , or to maintain her yen holdings. At the time of making a decision, the trader can condition on the realized price path as well as the calendar date t. Thus, the trading strategy of a trader is a mapping: t; (p u ) u t 7 ! fdollar asset, yen assetg (2) that speci…es whether a trader will hold dollars or yens for all pairs of dates and price histories.
Dominance Solvable Outcome
Our baseline model allows us to draw a very strong conclusion -starting from any price p 0 ; the price until the day of reckoning returns to the fundamental value v at the fastest possible rate. Any other outcome can be ruled out by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. The purpose of the benchmark analysis is to accentuate the contrast with our main result on the possibility of speculative dynamics.
Suppose that the price is p t . The most pessimistic scenario for the holder of the dollar asset is that all future traders either switch out of it, or refrain from buying it so that the price path is declining over time. Under this most pessimistic scenario, the price path is given by fp t+u g u 0 , where
The price converges to 1, as each trader whose trading date arrives switches out of the dollar asset.
Even under this most pessimistic scenario, there is a price at which a trader is better o¤ holding the dollar asset than the yen asset. Consider a speculator who has a chance to trade at date t. If the price path from date t onward is given by fp t+u g u 0 then the expected excess rate of return on the dollar is:
Thus, if the future price path is given by fp t+u g u 0 , the trader buys the dollar asset or holds on to it whenever (4) is greater than 0.
Note that the price dynamics (3) implies that
Plugging this inequality into (4) shows that the expected excess return under this scenario is larger than
As x t ! 0, the …rst term in (5) 
Since (6) This sets a new threshold p n+1 for the trading strategy, in which choosing yen for any price below p n+1 is ruled out by n + 2 rounds of deletion of dominated strategies. We thus obtain the increasing sequence:
Since price is bounded above, this sequence converges to some limit, denoted by p. No trader will choose yen below p in any rationalizable outcome, since such an action is ruled out by iterated dominance. Thus, p constitutes a ‡oor for the price of the dollar asset in any price path fp t+u g u 0 .
Analoguously, we can de…ne a decreasing sequence of thresholds that corresponds to the most optimistic price paths that are consistent with n rounds of deletion of dominated strategies. If the price is su¢ ciently close to the upper bound e k , then yen is strictly preferred since the price will never rise su¢ ciently to compensate for the risk that it could possibly fall to its fundamental value v. Let p 0 be the price above which selling is dominant.
Thus, the price path will never rise above this level. We can then iterate the argument to derive the decreasing sequence:
Denote by p the limit of this sequence. This limit would constitute a ceiling for any price path. Clearly,
We will now show that the reverse inequality must hold, too. Consider the ‡oor price p. We must have p v. To see this, suppose (for the sake of argument) that p < v. Since no trader sells dollars below p, the future path fp t+u g u 0 lies on or above p. Thus, conditional on a price p, the expected return on the dollar asset is strictly greater than one since all possible future values of the asset are larger than p and p < v. But this contradicts the fact that p is the upper limit of dominance thresholds. Buying the dollar would still be a strictly dominant strategy for some p t > p in this case. Hence, we must have
From an exactly analoguous argument, we conclude that v p. Thus, we have p v p
From (9) and (7), we conclude that p = p = v. We have thus proved the following.
Proposition 1 In any subgame, the only trading strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies is to hold the dollar asset when p t v and hold the yen asset when p t > v.
Corollary 2 In the unique equilibrium price path in the subgame that starts with price p t , the price converges to the fundamental value at the maximum speed that trading constraints allow for.
Our baseline model is in line with the hypothesis of the stabilizing role of speculation, as argued by Friedman (1953) . No matter how loose the anchor is to the fundamentals (a loose anchor corresponds to a small ), the speculative behavior of traders pushes the price to coincide with the fundamentals.
The iterative argument presented above rests on the price space being bounded, which may be regarded as an unappealing feature. However, we stress that the main purpose of our paper is to show that speculative dynamics is possible even with forward-looking traders. Having a bounded price space makes our task that much harder. Hence, the bounded nature of the price space could be seen as a feature that adds to the appeal of our main result, which follows in section 4.
In contrast to our main result, the impossibility of speculation given by our result above can be understood as the resolution of two competing externalities generated by the predecessors of the date t trader. As the predecessors throw more "weight of money"into the dollar asset, there are two e¤ects.
First, the positive externality is that the future resale values (p t+u ) u 0 will be high, other things being equal. But the negative externality is of course that the dollar asset is currently expensive. Because of the risk that the dollar asset reverts to its fundamental value, the negative externality ultimately wins out. Thus, a trader has no incentive to join in pushing the price away from its fundamental value. Instead, the trader will seek to trade against her predecessors to bring the price back into line with fundamentals. When is large and small, fundamental risk is small compared to the risk that other speculators create an adverse price move. In this case, the competition between positive and negative externalities is more even, in the sense that additional positive externalities tip the balance toward conditions that are more fertile to the emergence of destabilizing speculation, as we see now.
Funding Externalities
We add to our baseline model two features that capture realistic aspects of yen carry trades. First, we introduce an interest rate di¤erential between the dollar and the yen. For simplicity, assume that the yen asset yields zero in interest, and that the dollar asset pays interest at the rate . The interest is converted into yen at the exchange rate prevailing at the time it is earned. 3 Second, we take into account that speculation requires capital. When she enters a carry trade at date t (i.e. borrows yen to obtain a dollar asset) an investor needs to tie up some capital. In particular, only a fraction of the dollar asset equal to 1 h where h 2 (0; 1) can be …nanced by the sale of yen assets. The remaining fraction h has to be …nanced by the trader's own capital.
This feature of our model captures the haircut that a prime broker would require as collateral from the speculator. Our key assumption is that the capital requirement h decreases with respect to the dollar value p. In other words, the banks that lend to carry traders have a procyclical risk manage- A plausible explanation for this property of the capital requirement is that the lenders are less informed than the speculators, and thus do not know if an increase in p t is due to a speculative ‡ow or re ‡ects some fundamental news.
In the latter case, the collateral value of the dollar asset is enhanced in their eyes. If more cash in the market implies a possible higher collateral value of the trade in the eyes of the …nanciers, then speculators'leverage should increase with respect to p t . An explicit modelling of such funding frictions is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we take this feature as given and study its impact on exchange rate dynamics.
Capital requirements are updated for each trader at each trading date.
Thus, after entering a carry trade at date t, the trader subsequently incurs an opportunity cost of h (x t ) p t yen per unit of time until the next trading date (or the day of reckoning if it occurs before) because she ties up an amount h (x t ) p t of her own funds in the trade. In this new environment with …nancing constraints, the expected pro…t from a one dollar carry trade is the sum of two terms, as given below in (10).
capital gain or loss due to exchange rate ‡uctuations 
Assume
If is su¢ ciently large and su¢ ciently small, then there are multiple steady states starting from any price p t . In particular, there is both a steady state in which all traders enter the carry trade after t, and also a steady state in which traders exit the carry trade after t.
Proof. See the appendix.
In the statement of proposition 3, "enter the carry trade"is a shorthand for the statement that a trader enters the carry trade if she is not already engaged in the carry trade, or maintains the carry trade if she is already engaged in the carry trade. Similarly, "exit the carry trade"means that the trader exits the carry trade if she is engaged in the carry trade, and does not enter if she is not already so engaged.
To gain an intuition for this result, we can decompose (10) resemble Nash equilibria of this one-shot game between the traders. The fact that the two extreme steady states resemble multiple equilibria in the single-shot game suggests that trading decisions are strategic complementsthat is, the more other traders enter, the greater my incentive is to enter (and conversely, the greater the other traders exit, the more I want to exit). Thus, the strategic incentives become inverted, as compared to the benchmark case.
We commented after our benchmark Proposition in the previous section that the reason why speculation is stabilizing comes from the fact that the negative externalities created by previous buyers outweigh the positive externalities.
In Proposition 3, the roles are reversed. The positive externality of raising the price higher is larger than the negative externality. This is because for large and small, fundamental risk over the horizon of a trade is so small that the positive funding externalities always o¤set the risk of holding an overvalued asset.
When funding constraints create such strategic complementarities, the price path itself will in ‡uence expected payo¤s, and we cannot come to any …rm conclusions regarding predictable outcomes without additional argument. In general, we can envisage very complicated dynamic strategies that try to balance the negative and positive externalities between traders, and we cannot say much more without additional structure on the problem. Rather than going further in investigating complex dynamics, we will now go in a di¤erent direction. We will now examine what happens when the carry itself is stochastic.
Stochastic Fundamentals
It turns out that the multiplicity of equilibria in the previous section is not robust to the addition of some variation in the carry . Adding (possibly arbitrarily small) shocks on ; we obtain a unique dominance-solvable equilibrium. We draw on the work of Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000) , who showed that in binary action coordination games with strategic complementarities, the addition of small stochastic shocks to the fundamentals of the payo¤s generates a unique, dominance solvable outcome. The arguments in these papers are similar to the global game arguments of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998) . We return to an interpretation of the results later in the paper.
Formally, we assume in this section that the carry obeys the process:
where W t is a standard Brownian motion, and > 0. 4 In order to apply the mathematical framework developed by Burdzy,
Frankel and Pauzner, we need to impose that the sensitivity of the haircut h(:) to dollar value be su¢ ciently large. The particular requirement on the h ( ) function can be stated in terms of the following inequality:
The exact role of this condition will appear shortly. The main result of the paper is the following:
Proposition 4
Suppose condition (11) holds. Then, if is su¢ ciently small, there is a decreasing function Z (:) such that in any subgame starting at date t with a carry t and an exchange rate p t , there is a unique, dominance solvable solution to the trading game. In this solution, a trader who trades at date t
engages in the carry trade if and only if t Z (p t ).
It is interesting to contrast Proposition 4 with the results reported in Some suggestive features of the price dynamics can be seen from …gure 1. When the dollar has appreciated for a while so that p t is close to e k , the rate of return if the currency appreciates is given by
However, if the price crosses the Z boundary, the rate of depreciation is
In other words, when p is high and the currency crosses the Z boundary from above, there is a sharp depreciation that was preceded by a slow appreciation.
Such dynamics are suggestive of the price paths of high-yielding currencies in carry trades that "go up by the stairs and come down in the elevator".
To make our paper self-contained, we provide a proof of Proposition 4 that follows closely the argument given by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) for their discussion of binary coordination games. The di¤erence between our setup and the game studied in Frankel and Pauzner (2000) is that viewed from date t, the future instantaneous pro…ts at date t + u depend on p t+u , but also on p t (see expression (10)). Their proof applies in a very similar fashion, however, provided is su¢ ciently small.
Let Z 0 (:) denote the function such that if she believes that the other traders will exit the carry trade after t, a date-t trader enters the carry trade if and only if
We start with the following result.
Lemma 5
Z 0 (:) is Lipschitz and nonincreasing for su¢ ciently small.
Condition (11) is important in the proof of Lemma 5. It implies that the expected return on the carry trade increases as x t increases, holding beliefs about future buy and sell orders constant. This is because condition (11) implies that as x rises, the gain of a reduced cost of carry overcomes the expected loss caused by a higher downside risk and a smaller upside risk.
Relaxing condition (11) B, except for the fact that B has a higher current value t . This contradicts the hypothesis that a trader is indi¤erent between the two actions both at A and at B. If she were indi¤erent at A, she would strictly prefer to hold dollar at B, and if she is indi¤erent at B, she would strictly prefer to hold yen at A. But we constructed A and B so that traders are indi¤erent. Thus, there is only one way to make everything consistent, namely to conclude that A = B. Thus, there is no "gap", and we must have Z 0 1 = Z 1 . In other words, we have the situation depicted in …gure 1 as claimed.
Interpreting the Results
Proposition 4 demonstrates the impact of adding some uncertainty to the carry t . The multiplicity of equilibria reported in the previous section resulted from the feature that, if the fundamentals were …xed and known, then one cannot rule out all other players trading in one direction, provided that the fundamentals were consistent with such a strategy. However, the introduction of shocks changes the picture radically. Trades are far less nimble than the shifts in the carry. Thus, choosing to enter the carry trade versus exiting the carry trade entails a substantial degree of commitment over time to …x one's trading strategy. Suppose that the ( ; p) pair is close to a dominance region, but just outside it. If is …xed, it may be possible to construct an equilibrium for both actions, but when moves around stochastically, it may wander into the dominance region between now and the next opportunity that the trader gets to trade. This gives the trader some reason to hedge her bets and take one course of action for sure. But then, this shifts out the dominance region, and a new round of reasoning takes place given the new boundary, and so on. Essentially, adding shocks to the carry enables us to extend to the two dimensional space of ( ; p) pairs the dominance argument we showed in our benchmark result without funding externalities in section
1.
That Z(:) is nonincreasing implies that price paths exhibit hysteresis. If the dynamic system ( t ; p t ) is in the area where buying is dominant ( t > Z(p t )), then the buy pressure takes the system away from Z(:), making the continuation of a bullish market even more likely, all else equal. The reader may wonder whether Brownian excursions completely swamp this e¤ect at the proximity of Z (:), so that runs never develop and the system is "trapped" in the vicinity of Z(:). The next proposition shows that it is not the case provided is su¢ ciently small.
Proposition 7
Assume that the system is in the state (p t ; t ) such that and that is such that Proposition 4 applies. For any " > 0, as ! 0 , the last time at which the system hits Z(:) before x t+u becomes larger than m " or smaller than " tends to t in distribution. The probability that the price will go up tends to m x t m :
Proof Note that for a given su¢ ciently small, Proposition 4 guarantees the existence of the frontier Z( ; :) for any > 0; since all that is used in the proof if the fact that 6 = 0. Thus, we can apply Theorem 2 in The broad intuition for this result is that when is small, the price path around Z(:) is mostly driven by changes in x t : Fund ‡ows are more important than changes in the carry t . The speed at which the price goes up is k m
(m x t ), while it decreases with speed k m
x t : The price path does not revert to Z (:) once it has headed o¤ towards one direction, and the ratio of the probabilities to go up or down is the ratio of the speeds at which the price goes in each direction. If the system hits Z (:) when p t is very high (low), then it is most likely to bifurcate downwards (upwards).
In other words, if is su¢ ciently small, an econometrician who observes a sample of paths of ( ; p) generated by our model between dates 0 and T that start with a large (small) 0 will observe mostly upwards (downwards) bifurcations, and thus many small positive (negative) returns followed sometimes by a large negative (positive) return in the rare cases in which a reversal occurs before T .
Discussion
Evidence from Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) likely. This o¤ers empirical support for our assumption that the funding of a carry trade is more di¢ cult after a crash of the high rate currency. All these …ndings square with our description of a market in which speculative capital ‡ows slowly, so that an interest rate hike will lead a currency to appreciate only gradually, with possible sudden reversals.
In a related study, Gagnon and Chaboud study the relative frequencies of large upward and downward movements of three currencies relative to the dollar. They …nd that these frequencies are similar for the euro, which carried an interest rate close to the U.S. rate over the sample period. Conversely, large appreciations are relatively more frequent than large depreciations for the yen, while large depreciations are relatively more frequent for the Australian dollar. Gyntelberg and Remolona (2007) …nd similar conditional skewness for another sample of currencies.
Carry trades and leverage
One of our key assumptions is that the haircut h (x t ) is decreasing in x t . We provide some further discussion of this assumption based on the evolution 
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a dynamic asset pricing model in which speculators face a coordination problem because of procyclical capital requirements. Using recent methodological advances in game theory, we have obtained a unique equilibrium price that has appealing qualitative features. It implies a risk premium that is time-varying and countercyclical. The required return on dollar depends in a highly non-linear fashion on the dynamics of the interest rate di¤erential. A natural route for future research is to investigate whether such stochastic bifurcations models can also generate interesting quantitative implications.
Appendix A
In this appendix we give simple possible microfoundations of equation (1) in terms of the interactions between the speculators and a passive brokerage sector.
Assume that when trading at date t, a trader meets the brokerage sector. trading date t, the trader submits a supply or demand schedule to the dealers, and the non-…lled part is cancelled. As a result, p t solves:
where x t is the mass of traders who hold one dollar asset at date t. Equation (13) formalizes that the date t trader buys the dollar asset from the dealer who owns it and values it the least at date t, or sells it to the dealer who does not own it and values it the most at date t: This corresponds to a trade with a dealer with a valuation of F 1 ( xt m ) in both cases. Our speci…cation corresponds to the particular case in which
This particular speci…cation implies that dollar returns are simply proportional to net dollar ‡ows. All our results would hold with more general speci…cations of the function F (:) as long as the function ln F 
Proof of Lemma 6
To establish Lemmas 6 and 7, we will use the following result. Thus for su¢ ciently small,
and Z 0 (:) is Lipschitz decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 7
Consider two points ( t ; p t ) and ( t ; p we would obtain that the expected return starting from ( t ; p 0 t ) is larger than the expected return starting from ( t ; p t ) by comparing returns along pairs of paths with similar innovations in the carry. Thus Z 1 (:) would have to be decreasing.
But since in addition Z 0 (:) is decreasing, dollar will in fact be bought more often along the paths starting from ( t ; p 0 t ) than along the path starting in ( t ; p t ), thereby generating additional positive future returns starting with this higher price p 0 t relative to the case in which dollar is bought and sold at the same time regardless of the starting price. This reinforces the fact that Z 1 (:) is decreasing.
Consider now two points ( t ; p t ) and ( 
